The Anglo-Saxon Law Suit by Lewis, William Draper
THE
AMERICAN LAW REGISTER
AND
REVIEW.
NOVEMBER, 1894.
THE ANGLO-SAXON LAW SUIT.
By WImx "DRAPAR IUwxs, Ph.D.
One of the most common mistakes to which a student of
history is liable is to criticise past ages from the standpoint
of the age in which he lives. This error we apply in our
criticism of men and institutions. William the Conqueror
is condemned for the harshness of his actions, Henry V for
renewing the useless war with France, the critics forgetting
the rough habits of the time in which the Conqueror lived, and
the ideas of foreign war -and its justification prevalent in the
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. In the same spirit we
criticise the particular ideas prevalent in a prior civilization.
We single out some custom, which we have -abandoned, for
condemnation, forgetting the conditions which made it possi-
ble. For instance, nothing is so easy for the modem econo-
mist as to criticise the mercantile system of the middle ages.
It is true that, in modem conditions, to look upon the store
of a large quantity of gold in the country as the chief object
of mercantile legislation would be absurd; but in a state of
civilization where credit, in its modem sense, was little used,
where war, at least one-half of the time-, was to be expected,
and where victory depended as much upon the amount
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of gold in the coffers of the army in the field as on the
amount of amunition, or on the bravery of the men, a
policy which gathered in the country large stores of gold,
and which looked upon the favorable balance of trade as the
sine qua non of national prosperity, was perhaps one eminently
suited to thd conditions of mediwval life-one dictated by a
wiser and more profound knowledge of those conditions than
exists among the critics of the present day. In the domain
of law, it is no uncommon thing for some tyro to point the
finger of ridicule at the strictness of ancient pleading and the
apparent arbitrariness of technical rules; especially does he,
as we have seen him, ridicule the compurgation and ordeal
of his Saxon ancestors with their apparent total lack of
appreciation of the rules of evidence, or ideas of equity.
In this paper, we simply wish to point out some of the con-
ditions of Anglo-Saxon life, which rendered their conception
of a suit at law infinitely more' serviceable for the correct
administration of justice than our own modern ideas would
have been.
, The main features of the Anglo-Saxon suit are probably
familiar to all the readers of THE AMERICAN LAW REGISTER
AND REVIEW. The plaintiff himself summoned the defendant
to ccurt. A court was not a court in the modern sense of
that term. To us it is composed of one or more judges learned
in the !aw. These judges are officers of the government.
The judge or judges, sitting in a manner which the law directs,
is the court. The court, to the Anglo-Saxon, was the general
assembly of all the free men of the district; the larger the
district the larger and more important the assembly. The
County court was more important than the -court of the
Hundred. These assemblies had a presiding offier-a hun-
dred's ear!dor or a shire's gerefa; but the presiding officer was
not the court. The court-was the whole body of attendant
freeman. In this assembly the plaintiff made his claim.
Suppose it was a suit for a debt, the plaintiff might say: "In
the name of the living God, as I money demand, so have I
lack'of that which the defendant promised me when I mine
to him sold." Then the defendant was called upon to answer.
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He brought forth no facts to show the reason'he was not
indebted, just as the plaintiff had brought forth no facts to
prove that he was indebted. His choice was simply to admit
the debt or dsny the debt, and if he denied it, to deny it in
the words of the charge. Thus, the direct denial of such an
assertion would be: "In the name of the living. God, I owe
not to the plaintiff scatt, shilling, or penny or penny's worth,
but I have discharged to him all I owed him, so far as our
verbal contracts Were at first." Here was a direct assertion
and a direct denial: a fact in issue, as we would call it; a fact,
thd truth of which was with us to be determined by a judicial
investigation of the evidence. Not so with the Anglo-Saxon
court.
There was a direct assertion and a direct denial, and the
Saxon said: .As both offer to prove their assertion, we will only
allow one to do so. If he succeeds in proving his assertion,
then the matter will end ;" if he does not succeed, then the
judgment will go against him. Therefore, the judgment fol-
lowed instantly on the direct assertion and the direct denial.
The defendant in such a case would have the privileges of the
proof. That is to say, he would be permitted to prove his
denial, and if successful, that proof would clear him from the
suit.
There might be circumstances in which the plaintiff would
have the proof. For instance, supposing A claimed -that he
had lost his horse as the result of a theft, and that the horse
was now in B's possession. He charged B with having taken
it. B might be innocent of the theft. We. may suppose that
he might have bought the horse from C, who had stolen it from
A. In such a case, if he denied the theft, and claimed that
the horse was his from birth, of course, the direct denial gave
to the defendant the proof; but if he failed to prove his asser-
tion he would then be liable as a thief. Not caring to run this
risk, he might claim that he had bought the horse from C,
believing it to be C's of right. In such a case, the defendant
was allowed to clear himself by the ordinary proof from the
charge of theft, and the plaintiff had the proof so far as the
ownership of the horse and the original theft was concerned.
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The proof itself was not evidence adduced before the court,
of the sufficiency of which evidence the court judged in each
case. But for all cases there was a definite rule as to the
amount of proof and kind of proof necessary to establish an
assertion. This proof never consisted, as in a modern suit, of
a fact tending to show the existence or non-existence of the
fact in issue. This is made clear when when we perceive the
three kinds or classes of proofs allowed. The first was that
of oath with witnesses; that is to say, if the defendant pro-
cured a certain number of persons, differing according to the
respective social status of the parties to the suit, to swear that
they believed him to be telling the truth, that was sufficient to
satisfy the requirements of the proof. Or, he who had the
proof might procure a certain number of transaction witnesses,
or witnesses who would swear that they had been present at
the sale in the case which we have before described, and had
seen, with their own eyes, the money actually paid by B to A.
The second method of proof was that of ordeal, in which the
defendant appealed to the Deity to prove that his assertion
was correct. This solemn appeal was made in certain pre-
scribed forms. For instance, the ordeal of cold water, prac-
tically used, like all other ordeals, exclusively in criminal cases,
was one in which the accused, who had appealed to the ordeal,
was thrown into a pond or stream of water, where, if he sank,
he was innocent, and if he floated, it was considered conclusive
that he was guilty. Besides the ordeal of cold water we have
those of hot water, and morsel. The third method of proof
was that by document. This was used principally in suits
concerning land, and probably only after the introduction of
Christianity. It consisted in the production by the party who
had the proof of a written document establishing his assertion.
There arise, in the modern mind, many practical objections
to such an administration of justice as is here described. In
the first place, the very claim on the part of a plaintiff, without
any proof advanced by him to sdbstantiate that claim, will
put the defendant in the position of submitting to the plaintiff's
claim, unless he can prove his denial by one of three arbitrary
methods. Again, there is no investigation of the facts. A
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man who has a perfectly valid claim may lose it because an
unscrupulous adversary has denied it under oath, and has
hired, or in some manner procured, the requisite number of
persons to swear that they believed him.
These objections are perfectly valid, but we can imagine that
the Anglo-Saxon, if he were here to-day, could urge two valid
reasons why the conc!usion which we are at first tempted to
draw, does not follow. It would not have been better for him
to instantly substitute the modem conceptions of a suit with its
fact in issue and investigation by a jury under, the direction of
the court of that fact. In order to investigate and weigh evi-
dence, two things are requisite-time and the machinery suited
for such an investigation. Now, there is no doubt that the
court of the Anglo-Saxons had not time to investigate and
weigh the facts of every case which was brought before them.
They were called together in the open air. They came from
all parts of the shire or hundred, and all were more or less
anxious to return to theii various occupations. Even had
they the time, any attempt to decide each case on its merits
would have resulted in the worst of all judicial tribunals--a
tribunal in which the basis of decision was the whim of the
populace.
The Dikasts of Greece are a notorious example of popular
tribunals undertaking the decision of judicial questions. Prac-
tically no system of law grew up in Greece because of this
attempt of a comparatively primitive people to investigate the
facts of each case-i. e., to decide the dispute by popular
vote. But why, it may be asked, did they not institute a
regular court with a single judge; why not leave the question
of fact to be investigated by the sheriff, or referred to a single
man for arbitration, or a body of men, like the jury? Decisions
of a court, so called, are useless unless they are respected,
and the complete answer to this objection is that the Anglo-
Saxon would not have abided by the decision of such a
tribunal. To have the decision of a court or arbitrator con-
clusive on the parties, the judge must wield arbitrary power,
or be a person in whom the litigants have entire confidence.
Arbitrary powei, whether of king or judge, such as we know
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it in the East, was entirely foreign to the whole trend of
Anglo-Saxon civilization, and the referring of disputes to arbi-
trators, in whom both sides had respect, could not have been
a permanent method for administering justice. It is to the
iredit, we believe, of our Anglo-Saxon ancestors, that, in
spite of the knowledge of their most learned men of more
advanced judicial systems, which knowledge we can almost
presume from the learning of their clergy, they refused to
atterhpt to perform the impossible. A judicial absolutism
was out of the question. The tribunal whose decisions would
be obeyed in the majority of instances, thereby ending per-
sonal strife between the litigants, was incompetent from its
very composition to weigh evidence, and it did not attempt to
do so. Time and temper would have alike rendered it futile
to introduce evidence on either side. What- is the use of
going into the existence or non-existence of a fact in issue if
the evidence cannot be properly weighed? Again, just as the
tribunal would have been unable to decide between conflict-
ing evidence, so likewise it was incompetent to say, in any
particular case, whether the amount of evidence produced
on one side was sufficient to show that he who had the
proof had proved his case. Here again, we find that they
did not Uttempt to do the impossible. They prescribed gen-
eral rules as to the quantum of testimony sufficient to sub-
stantiate an assertion. Once this quantum had been obtained,
he who had the proof won the case. It was, therefore, a
sycstem in which the result did not in any way depend upon
the judgment of the court, or on the judgment of any part of
the court. No one was called upon to weigh evidence.
We believe that if we were translated back to that time, an
investigation would show that in the long run that system of
judicial administration was best which accomplished this very
result, viz.: the absence of all necessity for the courts to
determine disputed questions.
But further our Anglo-Saxon, replying to his modern critics,
might say that the methods of proof which he devised were
peculiarly well calculated, so far as arbitrary rules can ever
be calculated, to ascertain the party in whom the right lay.
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Their lires were open and simple. Their important trans-
actions of business, such as the buying and selling of cattle,
were by law required to be before witnesses, often in the hun-
dred court itself, or before the court of the manor. A person,
therefore, who claimed a right of another, and got eleven men,
or the number which the necessity of the case required, to
swear that they believed him, was probably making a just
claim; for the fact in controversy was much more likely to be
known to all the people of the neighborhood than a similar
fact in the private life of a modern individual. The very
method of ordeal, which seems to us the crudest and most
primitive part of" the whole procedure, had its origin in an
advance of humane instincts on the part of the people. When
a man who was friendless, who had no family to be his oath-
helpers, and who had been cast out by his own village, was
accused of crime and denied it, the giving of'the proof to him
would, perhaps, have been. useless, if he was required to bring
many witnesses to swear in their belief in his honesty. And
so, the Saxon in this quandary, gave him another chance.
They allowed him, in solemn form, to appeal to supernatural
authority; at first, perhaps, to the heathen gods, and, after
the introduction of Christianity, to God himself. It is true
that this appeal determined nothing as to the justness or
unjustness of the charge, but it was just as efficacious as any
attempted investigation of the facts would have been. Besides,
it was used only as a last resort and expedient, and was dis-
trusted by the Saxons themselves, as is shown by the fact
that the more the guilt of the accused appeared on the face of
the accusation, the harder the ordeal became: In the ordeal
of hot water, for instance, instead of plunging his hand in up
to his wrist, he. might be required to plunge it up to his
elbow; and even did he escape the ordeal, had his accusation
been made in early Norman times by the twelve men of his
neighborhood, he was obliged Jo leave the country.
It may be replied to the arguments here advanced that the
large number of cases we have from the Codex Diplomacus,
which were settled by agreement between the parties, and not
by regular legal procedure, shows that that procedure was
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unsa:isfactory even to the people of that time. The celebrated
expression in the case of Wynflaed and Leofwine is used to
prove this. It is as follows: "Then would have followed the
whole full oath of both men and women; but the Witan
who were there said it would be better to omit the oath
rather than give it, because after the oath there could be no
amicable arrangement:" Essays on Anglo-Saxon Law, p. 356";
Cod. Dip., DCXCIII.
The large number of suits, however, settled, and this
suit in particular, do not show, it seems to us, that the
methods of Anglo-Saxon legal procedure were unsatisfactory
to the people, but that in many instances, if carried to their
legitimate conclusion, the state would not have accomplished
its primary object in interfering between the disputes of pri-
vate individuals. That primary object is not the administra-
tion of justice, the determination of the right between man and
man, but the final settlement of a controversy which would
otherwise be continued indefinitely by personal altercation and
violence. When the assembly, perceiving, as it must often
have perceived, that the judgment of the court in strict legal
form would not have pacified the disputants and ended the
quarrel, then the friends of both parties stepped in and effected
a compromise. In doing this, they did not attempt to reach
an equitable conclusion, as would have been the case to-day,
but a conclusion which both parties would abide by; or, per-
haps, that which was more likely to occur-a conclusion which
the stronger party would submit to, when such party would
not have abided by a decision entirely against him.
Finally, one word as to the technicality of the procedure;
that if the defendant, in denying the claim of the plaintiff,.
stumbled or hesitated, or did not deny in the strict formula
prescribed by law, he lost his case. This strictness, which
seems to us at first only the dictate of imaginary and useless
consistency, was, we believe, in fact necessary to obtain any
regular administration of justice at all among not only the
Saxon, but any primitive people. If any latitude had been
allowed to the defendant in denying, or the plaintiff in stating
his claim, a slight variation might have brought forth a ques-
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on as to whether the denial was a denial or. not. Now,
.uestions of this kind the Saxon tribunal, as the primitive
rdbunal of all peoples, was wholly incompetent to decide.
Fhe strictness and technicality of the rules were necessary
!n order to avoid the possibility of all such nice questions
as whether a fact in issue had been raised.
We have said these few words in answer to a common
criticism of the institutions of' a past age. Its value, perhaps,
is slight, except the ethical one, that we should not misjudge
those who have gone before us. For, if we are careful to
judge from the standpoint of past conditions, past ideas and
institutions, our descendants, following our good example,
will be more lenient than they otherwise would be with
respect to some of our own ideas and actions.
